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Abstract: 
In a climate of intensifying globalization, the rise of political parties and leaders that espouse  
xenophobic ideas challenges the ability of the nation-state to live up to multicultural ideals. Such 
parties and their leadership prey on the fears of those of those who are part of the national 
majority group by claiming that “outsiders” entering or within the country pose a threat to their 
well-being and the sanctity of their national identity. While many scholars have analyzed 
xenophobic parties within specific countries or regions, few have sought to find commonalities 
over regional and cultural boundaries. This paper analyzes three contemporary instances in 
which xenophobic sentiments have become popular among right-wing party leaders from across 
the globe. Through analyzing the rise of Donald Trump in the United States, Viktor Orban in 
Hungary, and Narendra Modi in India, it provides insight into which circumstances allow for 
xenophobic rhetoric to become popular within right-wing parties. It demonstrates that while 
each country has a unique historical background, the rise of right-wing parties with xenophobic 
sentiments can broadly be interpreted as resulting from a combination of charismatic leadership 
with a perceived cultural/economic crisis, pressure from outside groups, and disillusionment 
over the policies or system represented by previous liberal leaders. 
 
Introduction: 
 
 “...if we are driving a car, we are a driver, [or] someone else is driving a car and we’re sitting 
behind…then…a puppy comes under the wheel, will it be painful or not? Of course, it is. If I’m a 
Chief Minister or not, I’m a human being. If something bad happens anywhere, it is natural to be 
sad.” 
Narendra Modi, Prime Minister of India 
 Interview with Reuters on the 2002 pogrom against Muslims in Gujarat   
 
“Those arriving have been raised in another religion, and represent a radically different culture. 
Most of them are not Christians, but Muslims…Europe and European identity [are] rooted in 
Christianity…Is it not worrying in itself that European Christianity is now barely able to keep 
Europe Christian? There is no alternative, and we have no option but to defend our borders.” 
Viktor Orban, Prime Minister of Hungary 
Editorial to the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung September 9, 2015 
 
“When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending the best. They’re not sending you, they’re 
sending people that have lots of problems and they’re bringing those problems [to] us. They’re 
bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists… And some, I assume, are good 
people.”  
Donald Trump, US Presidential Candidate 
 Presidential Candidacy Announcement Speech June 15, 2015  
 
 Each of the above quotes is from a current leader of a right-wing party. The first, from 
India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, refers to the death of over 790 Muslims in religious 
violence that took place under his tenure as Chief Minister of Gujarat. Modi failed to deploy the 
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police in a timely manner, and when police arrived many stated they had no orders to intervene 
to stop the violence (Sing 2009). In the quote, Modi downplays the incident as being regrettable, 
but denies culpability, comparing the deaths of Muslims to being like hitting a puppy with a car. 
The second, from the current Prime Minister of Hungary refers to the over one million people 
seeking refuge in Europe from the violence of the Syrian Civil War (Nolan and Connolly 2015). 
The third, from Republican Presidential candidate Donald Trump, refers to over 11 million 
undocumented Mexican immigrants in the United States, most of whom came to the United 
States fleeing violence from drug cartels or seeking economic opportunity (Pew Reaseach 2015). 
Trumps frames them first and foremost, not as people, but as criminals, rapists, and drug dealers.  
 While each of these leaders targets a different group of people, all their rhetoric 
dehumanizes that group because of their identity, whether it is their religion, nationality, or race. 
They frame that group as not belonging inside the borders of their nation because of some aspect 
of who they are or what they represent. As sociologist Evelyn Nakano Glenn wrote:  
“citizenship is not just a matter of formal legal status; it is a matter of belonging, 
which requires recognition by other members of the community. Community 
members participate in drawing the boundaries of citizenship and defining who 
is entitled to civil, political, and social rights by granting or withholding 
recognition."  (Glenn qtd. Hughey and Parks 2014:28) 
 
National political leaders, who have the privilege of a platform and followership, have an 
immense power to shape conceptions of who can have both social and legal citizenship in their 
country. In an era when people are becoming increasing interconnected through social media, 
travel, markets, and globalized conflict, such dehumanization threatens cooperation across 
borders, and can perpetuate conflict within them. This paper seeks to better understand how 
leaders who espouse such divisive sentiments can become popular in such differing contexts. 
Through examining the rise of right wing parties and their xenophobic leaders across the globe, it 
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shows the differing national contexts that shape xenophobic right-wing parties, while shedding 
light on commonalities that allow for their rise across geographic and cultural boundaries. 
 
Literature Review: Xenophobia, Nationalism, and Right-Wing Parties 
Xenophobia and Nationalism 
 Xenophobia is a concept that is inextricably linked to ideas of national identity and 
citizenship. The nation as an “imagined community,” is built upon shared understandings of 
political and social membership (Anderson 1991). Deciding membership in that community is a 
constant negotiation between groups competing over the power to define what it means to 
belong. Over time, through social interactions, definitions of “in-group”—people who belong, 
and are typically part of a majority group—and “out-group”—people who do not belong, and are 
typically part of a minority group—become built into conceptualizations of national identity. 
While most modern democracies have adopted constitutions that define citizenship based upon 
civic rather than ethnic identity, these two definitions of the state—blood/ethnicity/religion vs. 
legal citizenship/pluralism—are in constant contention (Hjerm 1998; Omer and Springs 2013).  
 Definitions of xenophobia are still contested within the literature, and vary based upon 
social contexts and geography (Yakushko 2009). While acknowledging these differing 
understandings, for purposes of this paper, xenophobia is defined using the UNESCO definition: 
“attitudes, prejudices, and behavior that reject, exclude, or vilify persons based on the perception 
that they are outsiders or foreigners to the community, society, or national identity” (UNESCO 
2016). This broad definition allows for a greater comparison across regions, cultures, and 
disciplines. Other scholars may contest this definition and point to different cultural 
understandings of xenophobia, but, in large part, xenophobia has been used as an umbrella term, 
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which covers or intersects with ideas such as racism, ethnocentrism, ethno-nationalism, nativism, 
and extreme nationalism or patriotism (UNESCO 2016; Wimmer 1997; Yakushko 2009; Hjerm 
and Nagayoshi 2011; Omar and Springs 2013).  
 The topic of whether or not xenophobia is “natural,” while still somewhat debated across 
disciplines, is more widely agreed upon within the social sciences. Some socio-biologists and 
primordialists contend that xenophobia could be a natural, protective human social adaptation 
built from a need to form groups with people like themselves, therefore out-casting others. 
However, among the social sciences, xenophobia is primarily understood a social reaction to 
perceived threats from changing power dynamics within and between nation-states (UNESCO 
2016; Merkl and Weinberg 2003; Appadurai 2006). 
Right Wing 
 The origins of the term “right-wing” can be traced back to the first stages of the French 
Revolution when the Assemblée Constituante was asked whether to allow the King to have veto 
power. Those who wanted to conserve the King’s power stood to the right, those who wanted 
change it stood to the left. From that point forward, to be referred to as politically “right” held 
connotations of desiring to conserve some sort of previous social order. However, definitions of 
right wing have changed based upon historic context. After the fall of fascism in Europe the 
1980s, the rise of the New Right transformed what it mean to be "rightist" (Ignazi 2003). 
 Today, variants of the term “right-wing” can refer to many sub-cultures, parties and 
movements (Merkl and Weinberg 2003).  Some equate right-wing with ideas of neo-
conservatism, namely an emphasis on individualism and moral traditionalism, a skepticism about 
the growth of post-material movements like environmentalism and feminism, and an unease with 
the growth of multicultural society (Ignazi 2003). This unease with the growth of multi-
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culturalism often leads neo-conservatives to claim that states have a "right to difference," or 
"national exceptionalism." They use this logic to justify xenophobia, rather than fall back upon 
previous socio-biological justifications (Ignazi 2003).   
 Another branch of right wing-ism is the "populist right-wing." Right wing populists 
depart from the traditional rightists in that they emphasize the importance of lower parts of 
society in their rhetoric. They often refer to the "common man," who has been disenfranchised 
by elitist institutions. In so doing, they tacitly acknowledge that by the "common man" they 
usually only mean poor members of a national majority group, who conform to their ideas of 
homogeneous national personhood. Right-wing populists generally are antagonistic toward big 
government institutions, especially when leaders have liberal tendencies (Ignazi 2003). The term 
"extreme" or "hard" right-wing can encompass aspects of all the aforementioned terms, but also 
connotes ideas of strong-nationalism, elements of racism or xenophobia, and a desire for a 
strong, militaristic state (Ignazi 2003). This paper will draw on these various aspects of modern 
"right-wing" thinking to characterize the leaders and parties in its three case studies, while 
acknowledging that moderations and variations exist within these classifications.  
Debates and Theories about Xenophobia and Right Wing Parties 
 While scholars widely agree that xenophobic sentiment becomes more prominent when a 
majority group becomes threatened by the presence of an “other,” there is much debate over how 
that “other” becomes perceived as a threat in the first place. The following section synthesizes 
common theories that have been used to explain both how xenophobic actions and rhetoric 
become popular generally, as well as circumstances that allow right-wing leaders come to power.  
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Economic Explanations  
 Some scholars contend that xenophobia and the rise of right wing leaders is more likely 
during times of increased economic competition (Merkl and Weinberg 2003; Wimmer 1997; 
Yakushko 2009). These theorists claim that “out-group” minorities create increased competition 
for limited, collective resources, and cause xenophobic movements when the “in-group’s” 
control of these resources is threatened (Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011; Yakushki 2009). According 
a subset of this theory, “split labor market theory,” xenophobia is most likely to occur against 
groups that directly compete with the native population’s job market opportunities. For example, 
they low-skill low-wage native laborers only become xenophobic if immigrants entering the 
country are also low-skill and would work for lower wages, increasing competition for their jobs 
and lowering their wages (Hjerm and Nagayoshi 2011). However, critics of this theory hold that 
it does not matter whether or not an outside group poses a real economic threat, but only if they 
are perceived as doing so (Yakushko 2009; Wimmer 1997). Applied to the rise of right-wing 
parties, this school of thinking contends that in times of relative deprivation, right-wing parties 
that scapegoat economically competing “outgroup” populations for economic problems will be 
more likely to come to power (Merkl and Weinberg 2003). 
Cultural Explanations  
  Rather than explaining xenophobia as stemming from economic forces, other scholars 
have favored focusing on culture and social institutions as the primary drivers of xenophobic 
attitudes. Functionalists, for example, contend that cultural differences from the native-born 
population can lead to increases in xenophobia, as groups become threatened by potential losses 
of political, economic, or social power (Wimmer 1997; Yakushko 2009). Others have critiqued 
this theory, explaining that measuring cultural difference of an "out-group" people is very 
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subjective. Instead, they argue that xenophobic movements are less attached to the cultural 
composition of the "other" group than they are about the perception of that “other” group is a  
threat. This threat can be symbolic if, for example, the native population believes that the “out-
group” endangers their way of life with their moral, religious, or cultural beliefs (Yakushki 
2009). In addition, some have critiqued the socio-biological overtone inherent in the functionalist 
school of thought, which, at least to some extent, must equate culture with natural traits people 
that cannot change or adapt in order to measure it as a cause (Wimmer 1997). Applied to right-
wing parties, this means that right-wing leaders who are able to frame the minority population as 
a symbolic threat will be more successful in passing xenophobic policies.  
 Another school of thought, phenomenology, contends that xenophobia is the result of a 
crisis within the host society, and is a way for the host population to reaffirm its national "self" 
during times of identity crisis (Wimmer 1997; Appadurai 2007). These scholars contend that 
societies revert back to basic definitions of "self" and "other" as defined by national historic 
myths, which look back to a better and simpler time, when their way of life was not challenged 
by groups they see as outsiders. This sense of cultural nostalgia allows xenophobes to justify 
claims that the presence of new "others" is the cause of national problems, and policies that call 
for their disenfranchisement or removal (Wimmer 1997).   
Political Explanations 
 Rather than focusing on the cultural explanations, others have sought to explain why 
xenophobic right-wing parties rise through focusing on power-dynamics. Discourse theory holds 
that discourse, and those who control it, have a great influence in deciding whether xenophobic 
parties become popular (Wimmer 1997). Some theorists in this school contend that the amount 
and type of attention that the media or high profile leaders give to xenophobic ideas shapes 
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whether these ideas will become popular and prevalent in political debates (Wimmer 1997). For 
example, an ill-proportionate media focus on extreme right-wing leaders can make them more 
popular, even if the coverage is negative. Similarly, negative coverage of groups targeted by 
xenophobic leaders can help to mobilize groups toward xenophobic right-wing parties and their 
leadership (Merkl and Weinberg 2003). 
 Rather than focus on institutions like the media, others have claimed that leadership 
within right-wing parties plays a large role in shaping whether or not these parties become 
elected. The "charismatic leader thesis" holds that media-oriented, charismatic leaders allow for 
the rise of right-wing party-members by giving a positive face to their movements. Charismatic 
leadership allows for the right-wing to rise because they create wide-spread, popular appeal that 
becomes associated with party and helps to bring coalitions together. Such leaders often become 
charismatic because their backgrounds or personalities resonate with national traditions or ideals 
(Merkl and Weinberg 2003). 
 Others contend that the greatest factor that determines whether a xenophobic party will 
succeed is political opportunity. They contend that right-wing parties tend to come to power 
when mainstream, more liberal opponents fail. For example, when mainstream parties fail to 
deliver on their promises or become perceived as corrupt, this opens the door for parties offering 
a viable alternative to those who want to protest the current state of affairs. Often these parties 
are right-wing, and pair ideas of strong ethno-nationalism with promises of economic growth 
(Merkl and Weinberg 2003) 
Integrated Approaches 
 While all of these theories offer insight, many prefer to use a multifaceted framework to 
understand xenophobia. For example, the integrated theory of prejudice shows how multiple 
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types of perceived threats can lead to the creation of prejudices such as xenophobia. These 
include realistic threats (the loss of political/economic power), symbolic threats (challenges to 
morals or beliefs), intergroup anxiety (fear of difference), and negative stereotypes (that others 
are different, more aggressive, or inferior) (Yakushko 2009). Scapegoating certain groups as an 
integrated threat can help right-wing groups to become popular because this creates a concrete 
group to blame for more abstract societal problems.  
 Other theorists have shown how interdisciplinary processes such as globalization have 
contributed to the rise of xenophobia and right-wing parties because of the challenge they present 
to traditional understandings of the nation-state and national identity. Authors such as Arjun 
Appadurai contend that the increased interconnectedness of groups (including diaspora 
communities) and the growth globalized institutions such as banks and transnational corporations 
since the 1990s have contributed to xenophobia and ethnic conflict by creating fear and 
uncertainty within the nation-state. The knowledge of the increased interconnectedness of 
minority groups globally creates a fear of changing power dynamics, as national minorities come 
to represent larger, global majorities or ideas such as terrorism. It is through this logic that 
comparatively small numbers of minority groups can become the objects of fear, and are 
perceived as threats to the national well-being. Their identities and very existence represent a 
threat to the power of the state. As nation-states have lost dominion over their own territory to 
transnational forces and actors, majority groups become anxious about losing their traditional 
place of status and belonging within their own country. They begin to seek means of controlling 
forces outside of their control, often by lauding their dominion over minority groups within their 
nation-state. Groups that play on this "fear of small numbers," such as right-wing parties, 
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become popular as they are able to provide certainty and a group to blame for an increasingly 
complicated and changing world (Appadurai 2007). 
Problems and Research Question:   
 While xenophobia and right-wing movements have been examined in a variety of ways, 
few studies have examined trends in the rise of xenophobia across geographic and cultural 
boundaries. While global institutions such as the UN recognize xenophobia as something 
needing to be addressed at a global level, going as far as to form international conferences to 
address xenophobia (ILO, IOM, OHCHR 2001), few studies on the topic are global in nature. 
While many articles address recent surges of xenophobia in India, Europe, South Africa, Japan, 
and the United States, for example, very few have drawn connections between them (Klotz 2016; 
Taras 2009; Yamaguchi 2013). Those that have primarily compare countries in the same region, 
or with similar cultural influences (for example Anglo-countries in different regions) (Hjerm 
1998; Hogan and Haltinner 2015). Lack of research comparing otherwise dissimilar countries 
fails to acknowledge the possibility of there being connecting contexts which could explain the 
rise of xenophobic right-wing parties globally. Through comparing the rise of right-wing leaders 
and parties in seemingly dissimilar countries, this paper seeks to answer the questions: How have 
xenophobic right wing parties become electorally successful in countries across the globe? 
Which contexts allow for the increased popularity of xenophobic right wing parties? 
METHODOLOGY: 
 The cases of India, Hungary, and the United States were chosen based upon the criteria 
that they are all contemporary examples of right-wing parties and leadership which have gained 
popular support. All three countries have democratic systems, and two--India and Hungary--have 
popularly elected right-wing national leaders. While the United States is an exception, in that 
 12 
Donald Trump has not yet been popularly elected at a national level, he is the likely winner of 
the Republican Party's nomination. This indicates that Trump has at least the popular support 
within registered members of Republican Party. In addition, India, Hungary, and the United 
States are diverse examples in that they exist in three different continents, and have varying 
cultural influences. They did not share a colonial history (though the United States and India 
were both colonized by Britain, the nature of the colonization was different). The United States 
is considered a "Western" country, Hungary is considered an "Eastern/Central European" 
country, and India is considered a "Non-Western/Asian" country. All three countries also vary in 
the type of xenophobia they are experiencing, as will be shown in the subsequent sections.  
 Using secondary sources, the rise of right wing-leaders was examined within each 
country's historic context. The first section of each case study explores historic factors which 
have shaped xenophobic sentiments within that nation. The second section explores the contexts 
in which each party has come to power in the past, and analyzes the rhetorical appeals used by 
the party during those elections. For the purposes of this study, past success of the Republican 
Party were not analyzed, as the United States' two-party system differs from the parliamentary 
systems in Hungary and India, and popular discourse on Trump sees him as more representative 
of "Tea Party" and "Birther" movements than the establishment Republican party. As will be 
shown, the Republican Party has only recently appropriated the rhetoric of those two 
movements. The last section of each case study analyzes the most recent election of each leader, 
as well as how each leader's background has shaped their party's brand and appeal to voters. For 
the two case studies which have elected national leaders already it also analyzes xenophobic 
actions taken since their election. Using this analysis, common themes and explanations were 
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drawn in order to make a claims about more universal contexts which allow for the rise of 
xenophobic right-wing parties.  
CASE STUDIES: 
India: 
Historical Context 
Pluralistic Democracy vs. Hindu Nationalism 
 India is the world's largest democracy with an estimated 1,251,695,584 people. Of these, 
79% are Hindu, and 14% are Muslim, 2.3% are Christian, and 1.7% are Sikh (CIA World 
Factbook 2016). While India is often highlighted for its pluralist and multi-cultural values 
inherited from the legacy of Gandhi and his non-violent social movement, this conception of 
Indian nationhood has been contested since its independence. The idea of India first and 
foremost as the Hindu motherland, manifested in the ideas of Hindutva, contradicts Gandhi's 
ideals, and challenges an accepting and pluralistic Indian state.  
 Hindutva, an ideology based upon the 1920s writings of Vinayak Savarkar, holds that 
that Hindus share a common nation, race, and culture. Hindutva forms the basis for the idea of 
Hindu nationalism, mainly that India is a nation that was built by and should serve Hindus (Bose 
1998; Nussbaum 2007). During debates around independence, groups such as the Rashtriya 
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), founded by H.S. Hedgewar, an independence activist, contested 
Gandhi's non-violent path. Instead, they claimed non-violence only emphasized ideas of Hindu 
weakness. To the majority of this group the only way to win back the Hindu holy land was to 
fight for it and prove their dominance. Early writings from the RSS emphasize that anyone 
foreign to Hinduism should have to convert, or agree to its values, in order to be part of the 
nation (Nussbaum 2007). As written by prominent RSS member Golwalker: "There are only two 
 14 
courses open to the foreign elements: either to merge themselves in the national race and adopt 
its culture, or to live at the sweet will of the national race…that alone keeps the national life 
healthy and undisturbed" (Golwalker qtd. Nussbaum 2007: 162). In 1948, Nathuram Godse, a 
member of the RSS, assassinated Gandhi, believing that in doing so he was protecting the purity 
of Hindu nationalism from a leader who was “pandering” to the Muslim minority (Dalrymple 
2014).  
 The RSS, which continues to operate as quasi-military and social organization today, was 
a precursor Hindu Nationalist parties such as the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The BJP was 
created in 1980 as a more moderate political branch of the Hindu nationalist movement, but has 
openly accepted Hindutva ideology since 1989 (DiSilvio 2001; Nussbaum 2007). Today, the BJP 
and RSS operate under an umbrella of political and social organizations representing the Hindu 
Nationalist agenda called Sangh Parivar (Nussbaum 2007). The RSS has roughly 40 million 
members, organized under 40,000 district centers across the country. In fact, Modi got his start in 
the RSS chapter in Gujarat, and he largely attributes the organization to shaping him as a leader. 
As he stated in an interview in 2014, “I got the inspiration to live for the nation from the RSS…I 
learned to live for others, and not for myself. I owe it all to the RSS” (Modi qtd. Dalrymple 
2014). 
Muslims as "Outsiders" 
 The perception of Muslims as outsiders also has a long history within India that can also 
be dated back to its independence. Though Gandhi never advocated partition, in 1947, as part of 
the terms of Independence, the British Raj was split into two separate territories—Muslim-
majority Pakistan, and Hindu-majority India. This resulted in one of the largest and most bloody 
migrations in human history. By 1948, more than fifteen million people had been uprooted, and 
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between one and two million were dead. Subsequent wars between the two countries have 
caused even more bloodshed, and the deaths of hundreds of thousands. Today, the border 
between India and Pakistan is one of the world's most heavily guarded (Dalrymple 2014).  
 Partition has had profound implications on perceptions of Muslims as untrustworthy 
outsiders to Hindus in India today. Partition created an association between Muslims in India and 
negative feelings about Pakistan. Hardline Hindus in India often harbor feelings that Muslims 
who stayed in India are secretly spies or traitors to the state, and belong in Pakistan (Singh 
2009). This plays out in the de-facto segregation of many Muslims to separate, less desirable 
neighborhoods in many more conservative states in India. For example, in Ahmedabad, a city in 
Modi's home state of Gujarat, many Muslims live in the less well-off neighborhood of Juhapura, 
often referred to as "mini-Pakistan" (Singh 2009). In recent years, terrorist attacks by radical 
Islamic groups both abroad and in nearby Kashmir have furthered this perception of Muslims as 
dangerous outsiders (Appadurai 2007).  
The Rise of the BJP 
 After independence, and until the late 1980s, India was almost exclusively ruled by 
members of the Indian National Congress Party (DiSilvio 2001). The Congress Party traces their 
roots back to India's independence and its first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who studied 
directly under Gandhi. Linking back to Gandhi’s tradition, the Congress Party stands for a 
secular Indian state and acceptance of social pluralism. However, in recent decades, the 
dominance of the Congress Party has been challenged. The BJP has been able defeat opponents 
from the Congress Party in areas they traditionally won seats. In elections in 1989, the BJP was 
effectively able to take 85 congressional seats, and since has been increasing their numbers in 
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parliament. Their growing influence was most recently demonstrated in Modi’s election as Prime 
Minister Modi in 2014 (DiSilvio 2001).  
 Part of the reason scholars point to for the rise of the BJP since the late 1980s is their 
ability to exploit failures of the Congress Party. The Congress Party, as the establishment party, 
has been blamed by the BJP for the rampant corruption and economic failures in India since the 
late 1980s. After Nehru, subsequent Prime Ministers from the Congress Party largely come from 
his family or close associates, including his daughter Indira Gandhi and her son Rajiv Gandhi. 
This has allowed the BJP to frame the Congress Party as a party of “princelings,” who use their 
association with Gandhi to keep themselves in power, and care little about the people (Dalrymple 
2014).   
 Another successful strategy was politicizing events that brought conflicts between 
Muslims and Hindus to the forefront. After losing badly in 1984 elections when they took a more 
moderate stance on Hindutva, and loosened their ties with the RSS, the BJP shifted its strategy. It 
rejoined with the RSS, openly embraced Hindtva, and formed an alliance with the even farther 
right party, Shiv Sena. Further, it exploited issues that pitted the Hindu population against 
Muslims. One contentious issue that the BJP politicized was the Shah Bono Case. The Shah 
Bono Case was a Supreme Court Case in which a Muslim woman won the right to receive 
alimony from her divorced husband. However, the case was overturned after Parliament passed 
the Muslim Women Act in 1986, which denied Muslim women this right. The BJP took a strong 
stance against the act, framing the Congress as panderers to patriarchal Muslim men. More 
broadly, they used the case to point out contradictions of secularism and the Uniform Civil Code. 
In contrast, they framed themselves having a strong moral center as being as protectors of 
women’s virtue (Seshia 1998; Appadurai 2007). 
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 In 1992, the BJP also widely publicized the Babri mosque issue in Ayodhya. Hindus 
claimed that a mosque on the Hindu holy site of the birthplace of the god Rama should be 
demolished, and the BJP signed a declaration of support for the cause. While the government 
never got behind the cause, in 1992, a group of radical Hindu nationalists destroyed the mosque. 
In the subsequent riots, about 2,000 people were killed and were 8,000 injured, but the police did 
little to intervene (Dalrymple 2014). The rebuilding of the area was a widely contentious issue. 
Eventually, in 2010, a court decided the Ayodhya land would be divided into 3 parts, with 1/3 
construction of the Ram temple, 1/3 going to the Islamic Sunni Waqf Board, and the remaining 
1/3 going to a Hindu religious denomination Nirmohi Akhara (Metacalf 2012). However, the 
BJP’s strong pro-Hindu stance on the mosque issue won them over 20% of the popular vote in 
the subsequent elections in 1996 (Seshia 1998; DiSilvo 2001).  
 Similarly, the BJP took a strong stance when, in 1999, Pakistan invaded the Northern 
state of Kashmir. During the violent conflict, the BJP even went as far as to threaten nuclear 
warfare. Then National Secretary of the Party, Modi publically stated, “we will respond to a 
bullet with a nuclear bomb,” showing a strong protectionist stance (Modi qtd. Dalrymple 2014). 
 Besides taking a strong pro-Hindu stance, the BJP has also exploited Congress 
government failures in order to frame themselves as providers of economic development. For 
example, after an earthquake in Latur in 1996, the BJP collectively donated a day’s salary to the 
relief efforts and mobilized members of Sangh Panvar to provide direct relief to the victims. This 
stood in stark contrast to Congress Party’s slow, minimal reaction to the event (DiSilvio 2001). 
 Similarly, today, a large part of the BJP’s success has rested on its promise to provide 
stability and economic growth. In the years prior to Modi’s election as Prime Minister, the Indian 
economy had a dismal performance. India's economic growth dropped from 9% between 2010 
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and 2011 to less than 5% by 2014. In addition, the between 2004 and 2013, the price of food 
increased 157% (Dalymple 2014). The BJP promises to provide electricity to every city, and that 
all of India will be “lit up like Gujarat,” (Modi’s prosperous home-state) (BJP website 2016). 
Despite having only 5% of India’s population, Gujarat accounts for 7.6% of India’s GDP 
(Economist 2015). Such promises for economic prosperity during economic downturns have 
made the BJP seem like an attractive alternative to the Congress Party.  
 In summary, the rise of the BJP and Modi since the late 1980s has rested on their ability 
to 1.) Effectively blame the establishment Congress Party for economic failures, government 
inefficiency, and corruption within the Indian State 2.) Connect these woes with the idea that the 
Congress Party lacks the moral center because of its secularism 3.) Bring contentious issues that 
pit Muslims against Hindus to the forefront while forming coalitions with other Hindu 
Nationalist groups 4.) Emphasize promises of development and economic growth (Seshia 1998; 
DiSilvio 2001; Appadurai 2007).  
Modi: Progroms, Beef, and Sedition 
 Modi’s unique backstory has played a large role in the changing more recent perceptions 
of the BJP. In 2014, with Modi’s election, the BJP won a majority in the Lok Sabha, the first 
time any party has done so since 1984. In stark contrast to the “princling” image of the Congress 
Party, Modi grew up the third of six children in a lower-caste family. Growing up poor, he 
worked at his father’s tea stand in order to make money after school. In his early teens, Modi 
joined the RSS, which is where he was first exposed to ideas of Hindu nationalism. In 1987, after 
finishing college, he joined the BJP, quickly rising to become its national secretary in 1995 
(Dalrymple 2014). He went on to become the first non-Congress Chief minister to be re-elected 
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two times in his home state of Gujarat. He served in that role from 2001, until he was elected 
Prime Minister of India in 2014 (Dalrymple 2014).  
 Modi’s “rags-to-riches” tale, and the economic prosperity he has brought to his home 
state of Gujarat have inspired many to join to the BJP, seeing in Modi hope for their own future 
economic success. While prior to Modi, the BJP was largely perceived as an elitist party that 
drew votes primarily from the upper-castes, Modi has brought a wider swath of the population 
into the BJP’s fold (Jaffelot 2013).  
 Modi’s campaign strategies have emphasized ideas of high-tech populism and patriotism, 
overshadowing the divisive Hindutva rhetoric within his party. Modi’s election campaign was 
more personalized than previous ones. He projected himself as an embodiment of Gujarat’s 
success and the future success of the Indian nation (Jaffrelot 2013). His clean-cut image and 
archetypal saffron kurta embodied his promises to “clean up” the corruption in Indian politics, 
and restore morality to the state. Further, his promises to modernize India were reflected in 
campaign. Modi has tapped into social media with Twitter #ModiMantra, even going as far as to 
use over 100 holographic shows to communicate directly with constituents during his campaign. 
In doing so, he simultaneously made himself into both a “man of the people” and a symbol of 
modernity (Jaffrelot 2013). He has used the rapid industrialization of his home state of Gujarat as 
a model for what he can do for the Indian state (BJP website 2016; Jaffrelot 2013). Modi’s 
emphasis on economic development and modernity has overshadowed the xenophobic far-right 
elements within his party.  
 While Modi is inspiring to some, to others he represents a threat to ideas of pluralism and 
secularism. He has a close association with Amit Shah, the BJP’s party president, who was 
arrested, and later acquitted, for his role in he extrajudicial killing of accused Pakistani spy 
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Sohrabuddin Sheikh and his family (Jaffrelot 2013). However, one of the greatest stains on 
Modi’s image has been his handling of the 2002 riot in Gujarat. In 2002, a train carrying 58 
Hindu pilgrims returning from Ayodhya mysteriously caught on fire. Hindus immediately 
claimed the incident to be an attack by Muslims, a characterization that Modi supported at the 
time (Dalymple 2014). In the subsequent backlash, 790 Muslims and 254 Hindus were killed, 
2,500 people were injured non-fatally, and 223 more were reported missing (BBC 2005). As 
Chief Minster, Modi was slow to deploy the police, and when the police arrived many stated they 
“had no orders to intervene” (Singh 2009). While the Indian Supreme Court cleared Modi of 
having direct involvement in inciting the riots, he has been widely criticized for his neglect in the 
incident (Dalrymple 2014). When asked about the incident in interviews, Modi has whether 
refused to answer questions, or expressed only minimal remorse, comparing the incident to being 
regrettable like hitting a puppy with a car (Dalrymple 2014).   
 Since Modi’s election, far-right Hindutva elements in India have been emboldened. For 
example, in 2015, hardline Hindus resurfaced demands for a national ban on cow slaughter. A 
50-year-old Muslim man was lynched after rumors that his family ate beef for dinner. That same 
year, 10 to 12 BJP legislators attacked a state assembly member named Abdul Rashid after he 
held a "beef party" in protest of the proposed beef ban (Mogul 2015). In February of 2016, the 
police arrested a college student, Kanhaiya Kumar, the president of J.N.U.’s student union, on 
sedition charges, after he was supposedly heard shouting, “Long Live Pakistan” at a rally 
protesting the BJP. The footage capturing Kumar yelling “seditious” sayings was later found to 
be doctored (Calamur 2016). While since the events Modi has stated that, “the country has to 
stand united. Harmony, brotherhood, and peace will lead us to development,” his neglect to 
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prosecute or subdue more radical elements in his party shows a shift in Indian politics (Gowen 
2016).  
Hungary: 
Historical Context 
Ethnicity, Religion, Migration and Ideas of Hungarian Nationalism 
 Ethnicity has played a large role in shaping Hungarian ideas of nationalism. Today, over 
85% of the country recognizes as belonging to “Hungarian” ethnic group (CIA World Factbook 
2016). After the Austro-Hungarian Empire fell in World War I, the Treaty of Trianon broke up 
the Hungarian territory. This left over 30% of Hungary’s population living in the newly formed 
neighboring states of Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine (Csepeli and Örkeny 1998). This included 
over 3 million people from Hungary’s major ethnic group—the Magyar (Ramet 1984). The 
Magyar ruled over the Hungarian territory for most of its history, and are linguistically unique 
compared to Slavic-speaking peoples in the region. The Treaty of Trianon led to a fear of 
absorption or loss of Magyar culture and language to surrounding Slavic population (Cseplei and 
Örkeny 1998). Since then, a large focus of Hungary’s immigration policy has been attracting 
Magyar people back to the Hungarian state, including creating a special worker programs for 
“ethnic Hungarians” (Ramet 1984). Most recently, a 2001 law provided special privileges to 
ethnic Hungarians living abroad who were seeking jobs in the fields of education, employment, 
travel, or culture, and gave them financial aid to alleviate costs to enter the country for work or 
study (Juhász 2003). Such laws reflect the desire to preserve Magyar culture, and bring back 
Hungarians separated from the country since the Treaty of Trianon.  
 Religion has also greatly influenced ideas about who belongs in the Hungarian nation. 
Catholic King Saint Stephan founded the Hungarian Kingdom in the year 1000 AD. Hungary’s 
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choice to adopt Catholicism and Calvinism separated it from the Eastern Orthodox Church under 
the Byzantine Empire. Later, Hungary suffered harsh treatment under the rule of Muslim Turks 
under Ottoman Empire from 1541 to 1699, which compounded ideas of a Christian state (Csepli 
and Örkeny 1998). During the Soviet era, the Catholic Church played a large role in resisting 
harsh Communist Party rule. For example, when the Soviet Union tried to secularize Hungary by 
removing Christian heroes from Hungary's national history, Catholics like Cardinal József 
Mindszenty took a strong stance against the Soviet Union. Mindszenty loudly promoted ideals of 
religious freedom, and fought for Hungarian independence until he was jailed in 1949, following 
a Soviet show trial (Ramet 1984). Today, such figures are viewed as national heroes and shape 
ideas that Hungary has and should be a Christian state. The Catholic religion remains one of the 
few ways to identify ethnic Hungarians living in the primarily Orthodox surrounding states 
(Ramet 1984).  
 Xenophobia against people of non-Chistian or non-Magayar origin has a long tradition in 
Hungary. For example, from 1938 to 1944 legislation barred Jews from citizenship, making them 
non-persons, and leading deportation and mass killing of over 600,000 Jews (Csepli and Örkeny 
1998). Under Soviet rule from 1947-1989, Hungary’s borders were almost completely closed, 
except for brief period in 1956 following an anti-Soviet uprising led by Imre Nagy (Juhász 
2003). However, after the fall of the Soviet Union, xenophobic sentiments in Hungary became 
especially prominent as it transitioned from being an emigrant nation to receiving large numbers 
of immigrants from Eastern Europe. Its central location made it a point of transit for migrants 
from Eastern satellite nations who sought to move West. Reflecting its experience today, in the 
years following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Hungary had to build refugee camps to 
accommodate the massive influxes of migrants. Xenophobia against immigrant groups from 
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surrounding Eastern European states was especially prominent during this time. Slavik migrants 
from the Soviet Union, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Translyvania were seen as competing against 
the native population for jobs, and were often subjected to xenophobic attacks (Csepli and 
Örkeny 1998).  
 Seeing non-ethnically or religiously Hungarian peoples as outsiders has continued 
through the post-Soviet era. Hungary maintained geographic limitations to adopting the United 
Nations’s 1951 Status of Refugees until 1998. Until that year, refugee status in Hungary could 
only be granted to migrants from Europe (Cahn 2016). In 1993, Hungary passed the Minorities 
Act, which encouraged these groups to form their own associations and local governments based 
on cultural autonomy rather than integration (Csepli and Örkeny 1998). Such acts show an 
institutionalization of the belief that state should primarily function for ethnic Hungarians, and 
that others should be on their own.  
 Public opinion about immigration and non-Christian peoples has been consistently 
negative in recent decades. A study from 1999 found that 73% of Hungarians believed that 
immigration increased criminality, and 52% believed immigrants took jobs from locals. A survey 
of over 3,000 Hungarians conducted in 2000 found that over two-thirds of respondents thought 
that there were “too many foreigners in Hungary” (Nyíri 2003). Studies using surveys from 
2005-2009 found that 24% of Hungarians wouldn’t want to live near foreigners and 29% viewed 
Jews as unfavorable to the nation (Horn 2015). Recent terrorist attacks in Europe have also likely 
negatively influenced perceptions of Muslims migration within Hungary. These have included 
the bombing of Madrid’s commuter rail in 2004, the suicide bombing of London’s subway in 
2005, and the firebombing of Charlie Hebdo (a French magazine that published a cartoon of the 
prophet Muhammad) in Paris in 2011 (Onyanga-Omara 2015). Such events, as well as existing 
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biases against non-Christian and Hungarian people have made it politically expedient to espouse 
negative opinions about immigration (Nyíri 2003).  
The Rise of Fidesz  
 The Fidesz Party was founded in 1988 as the party of the Hungarian anti-Soviet youth 
opposition movement. However, its ideological standing has shifted over time. At its conception, 
it was a more liberal party representing libertarian, anti-communist views, and the youth. After 
performing badly in elections in 1994, it changed its stance to reflect more socially conservative 
views, and utilized the right-wing voting bloc. Subsequently, Fidesz, under Viktor Orban, 
became the ruling power in Hungary for the first time in 1998 (Andor 1998).  
 The Fidesz Party's success in 1998 hinged on its ability to exploit failures in the 
Hungarian Socialist Party, and shift support from other right-wing parties. In the 1998 elections, 
Fidesz campaigned on promises to aid the poor by restoring benefits that were abolished by 
Socialist Party, and restrict the influence of foreign capital in the Hungarian economy (Andor 
1998). Fidesz focused on the Bokros economic stabilization package, which was passed 1995 
under the Socialist government, and had lowered interest rates on foreign capital, while cutting 
social benefits. Though the Hungarian Socialist Party was expected to win in 1998 because the 
country had experienced significant economic growth, the first round of voting was marked by 
low voter turnout, with only slightly greater than half the population going to the polls. This 
played to Fidesz’s advantage, as most of the third-place right-wing candidates dropped-out, 
giving their constituencies to Fidesz. Fidesz beat the Hungarian Socialist Party in a narrow race 
of 134 to 148 mandates (Andor 1998).  
 Fidesz remained in power until 2002 when it lost to a leftist coalition of the Hungarian 
Socialist Party and Liberal Free Democrats. The center-left coalition continued to win the 
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majority in national elections until 2010, when Fidesz gained a landslide victory, winning over a 
two-thirds majority in Parliament, and it has remained in power since (BBC 2015).  
 A large reason for Fidesz’s large victory in 2010 was the perceived corruption of the 
Hungarian Socialist Party. In 2006, after the Hungarian Socialist Party won elections, a tape was 
leaked wherein the newly elected Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány admitted to having lied on 
the campaign trail about Hungary’s economic success. Gyurcsány was quoted saying "… we 
screwed up. Not a little, a lot. No European country has done something as boneheaded as we 
have… Evidently, we lied throughout the last year-and-a-half, two years. It was totally clear that 
what we are saying is not true” (Gyurcsány qtd. BBC 2006).).  
 After the statements aired, thousands of Hungarians took to the streets to demand 
Gyurcsány’s resignation. Gyurcsány promised to resign if the reputation of his party could not 
recover in four years (BBC 2006). Two years later, the 2008 global financial crisis struck 
Hungary harder than any other Eastern-block European country, shrinking its economy by nearly 
5% in 2009. Gyurcsány resigned with an 18% approval rating, the lowest ever for a Prime 
Minister since Hungary became a democratic nation (Freeman 2009). Orban, who already had 
associations with strong, moral Christian leadership from his first term as Prime Minister, 
quickly filled the gap left by Socialist Party in the 2010 elections.  
 Another reason that Fidez was so successful in 2010 was its ability to adopt rhetoric of 
emerging hard-right wing parties. In the years prior to the 2010 elections, Jobbik, a hard-right 
student-based party was gaining momentum. In 2006 it captured only 2.2% of the popular vote, 
but by 2010 it had captured over 16%. Jobbik’s platform rested heavily on anti-Gypsy, anti-
Semitic rhetoric, and a strong anti-European Union stance. By adopting the strong ethno-
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nationalist rhetoric of Jobbik, Fidez was able to co-opt some its voter base, and keep itself in 
power (Nagy, Boros, and Vasali 2013).  
 In summary, Fidesz’s electoral success since its beginnings has hinged on its ability to 1.) 
Draw from the rhetoric and electoral blocks of other right-wing parties in Hungary 2.) Blame its 
Socialist Party opponents for economic and social woes 3.) Exploit the mistakes and corruption 
within the Socialist Party 4.) Offer itself as a strong, nationalistic alternative using its history 
tracing back to 1989 (explored in the subsequent section). 
Orban: Censorship, Fences, and the Refugee Crisis 
 Viktor Orban’s background has also played a role in the rise of the Fidesz Party. Orban 
was one of the founding members of Fidesz when it was only a student organization 1988. 
However, he didn’t arise as the group’s undisputed leader until 1989 when he gave a speech at 
the re-burial of Imre Nagy. Nagy was the executed leader of the failed 1956 uprising against the 
Soviet Union, and is widely considered a national martyr. In his speech, Orban called for a full 
removal of Soviet troops and free and fair elections, both of which occurred by 1991 
(Encyclopedia Britannica 2016). Orban’s legacy dating back to his 1989 speech has associated 
him with ideas of patriotism and Hungarian nationalism.  
 However, since his rise to power in 2010, Orban has been criticized for having 
authoritarian tendencies. In 2011, Orban and his supermajority tried to pass a law that would 
require media outlets to the register content with the state. After public and international outcry, 
the proposed law was scaled back, but Orban has continued to be criticized for influencing the 
content of state-owned media (Dunai 2014; Encyclopedia Britannica 2016). Since the law 
passed, Klubradio, a liberal radio station, has lost its broadcasting frequency, and Index.hu, a 
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popular online news portal, was banned from reporting on parliament after giving critical 
coverage (Economist 2012). 
 In addition, Orban has been criticized for making Hungary's new constitution more 
exclusive and religious. In 2011, Orban used his supermajority in Parliament to pass a series of 
laws that allowed for the adoption of a new constitution. The new constitution places special 
value on Christianity, stating that “[Hungarians] recognize the role of Christianity in preserving 
nationhood” (Fundamental Law 2011). The new constitution was criticized by groups such as 
Human Rights Watch for its religious rhetoric, which only includes traditional families as being 
protected by the state (Human Rights Watch 2011). The constitution states: 
Hungary shall protect the institution of marriage as the union of a man and a 
woman established by voluntary decision, and the family as the basis of the 
survival of the nation. Family ties shall be based on marriage and/or the 
relationship between parents and children (Fundamental Law 2011). 
 
Such rhetoric establishes a heteronormative definition of family and marriage, which ties 
back to Christian values. 
 Most recently, Orban has been criticized for his harsh handling of the Syrian refugee 
crisis. Orban has vocally refused to take Syrian refugees, especially those who are Muslim. 
 As a frontier member of the Schengen free travel zone, Hungary has been an entry point for the 
over one million refugees seeking refuge in Europe from Syrian Civil War coming through the 
Balkan route (BBC 2016; Figure 1). According to European Union law, if denied asylum in their 
country of destination, refugees are to be sent back to their country of entry to be processed. In 
response, in fall of 2015, Orban ordered a barbed wire fence to be built along the Serbian and 
Croatian borders and patrolled by the military to prevent refugees from entering the country 
(Feher 2015).  
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 Treatment of refugees who are able to enter Hungary has been especially harsh. In 
September, police were deployed to stop refugees from boarding trains in Budapest bound for 
Germany, which has adopted an open-door policy for Syrian refugees. Orban has used Dublin 
Agreement, which is a part of EU-law that requires anyone who wishes to travel in the borderless 
Schengen free-travel zone to hold a valid passport and visa, to justify his actions. Orban’s 
government has held refugees at ill-equipped camps to be processed, until German Prime 
Minister Angela Merkel temporary lifted the Dublin agreement to allow refugees to travel there 
(Nolan and Connolly 2015).  
 Orban’s use of religion as the reason to deny refugees entry to Hungary, and Europe more 
generally, has drawn his harshest criticism. For example, at news conference with the President 
of the European Council, Orban stated:  
“We don’t want to and I think we have a right to decide that we do not 
want a large number of Muslim people in our country. We do not like the 
consequences of having a large number of Muslim communities that we see 
in other countries, and I do not see any reason for anyone else to force us to 
create ways of living together in Hungary that we do not want to see.” 
(Orban qtd. Mackey 2015) 
 
While whether or not Orban’s reaction to the refugee crisis has gained him additional support 
from hard-right constituents is yet to be seen, it is clear his actions have come at a high human 
cost for those fleeing areas stricken by violence from the Syrian War. 
United States: 
Historical Context 
Racism, Nativism, and Islamophobia in the United States 
 Racism and nativism have a long history in the United States. Racism was first used in 
the United States as an ideological justification for the enslavement of non-European peoples 
during the colonial era, but continues to perpetuate views of non-Whites as inferior outsiders 
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today (Fields 1990). Dating as far back as the 1860, political parties like Dixiecrats used 
racialized political messaging to portray non-Whites as hyper-sexual, violent, and lazy to try to 
prevent abolition. Today, political appeals to racism in the United States rarely take such a 
blatant form. Instead, they are often more subtle, such as attacks on affirmative action programs 
which are set up to equalize economic opportunities between minorities and Whites, or “political 
correctness,” that prevents Whites from lauding their privilege over minorities (Hughey and 
Parks 2014). 
 Similarly, nativism—the belief that the culture of native-born or established inhabitants 
needs to be protected from national outsiders—can be found in politically-organized groups in 
the United States as far back as the early 1800s. Groups such as the Know-Nothing-Party, 
American Protective Association, and the Ku Klux Klan, all adopted nativist rhetoric to justify 
their appeals (Knobel 1995). Inherent in their claims was a belief in the myth that the United 
States is not a nation of immigrants, but a nation of “founders.” As such, all those who came 
after the Anglo-Saxon-Protestant forefathers were expected to adopt their cultures, habits, and 
beliefs to conform (Huntington 2004). The ideologies of nativism and racism in the United States 
shape beliefs that Protestant White males are the “standard” and “normal” representatives of 
American citizenship (Hughey and Parks 2014: 83). 
 Islamophobia has only more recently come to the forefront in American discourse. After 
the terrorist attacks of 9/11, fear of Muslims and Arab peoples grew within the country. Both 
public symbols of Islam such as mosques as well as “Muslim-looking” (usually Arab or 
Southeast Asian) peoples became unprecedented victims of backlash in the form of hate crimes. 
President Bush’s subsequent invasion of Iraq relied heavily on rhetoric that framed Muslim 
rulers and Arab peoples as being barbaric threats to ideals of freedom and virtue. Patriotism in 
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the post 9/11-era has relied heavily on the “other”ing of Muslim and Arabs (Khawly 2004). Such 
rhetoric continues to shape American perceptions of Muslims today.  
The Rise of the Birthers and Tea Party 
 The Birther and Tea Party Movements can both be seen as recent manifestations of 
racism and nativism in the United States. The Birther movement began in 2008 as a reaction to 
the popularity of Black presidential candidate Barrack Obama. The Birther movement demanded 
that Obama release a copy of his birth certificate in order to prove he was eligible to run for 
president. Birthers believed that Obama was born in Kenya, to a Kenyan father, and, therefore, 
ineligible to run for president. However, their demands did not end after Obama released a copy 
of his certificate that year (Hughey and Parks 2014). One of the lead voices that kept the 
movement alive was Donald Trump, who leveraged his celebrity status to keep the issue in the 
news cycle. After hearing news that Obama had released his birth certificate Trump stated:  
“We have to see. Is it real? Is it proper?...Because it’s rather amazing that 
all of a sudden it materialized…The word is, according to what I’ve read, is 
that he was a terrible student when he went to Occidental. He then gets into 
Columbia, and then gets to Harvard…How do you get to Harvard if you’re 
not a good student…Why doesn’t he release his Occidental records?” 
(Trump qtd. Hughey and Parks 2014: 45-46) 
 
Such demands blurred line between ideas of de facto and de jure citizenship. Obama had not 
only to prove that he was a legal citizen, but also that he had earned his place as a presidential 
candidate, and was not the “free-riding” affirmative action recipient. In addition, Birthers 
claimed that Obama could not be American by pointing to his middle-name--Hussein. Using his 
middle name and pictures of Obama wearing traditional garb on a visit to Kenya as evidence, 
Birthers claimed that Obama was a "secret Muslim." Lumping together claims about Obama's 
identity and politics to frame him as a free-riding, Muslim, Socialist, Birther's claimed that 
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Obama's identity disqualified him for the White House. While the Birther movement largely died 
out after Osama Bin Laden was assassinated under Obama's presidency (Hughey and Parks 
2014), elements of its "othering" rhetoric can still be seen in this year's election. 
 In tandem with the Birther movement was the rise of Tea Party movement. The Tea Party 
began to organize after Obama's election in 2009, under the pretense that a political revolution 
like the 1776 Boston Tea Party was needed to protect America from the growth of big 
government. As the Tea Party movement grew, it split into several sub-organizations. Each of 
these sub-organizations can be linked to nativist or race-based groups. For example, 
TeaParty.org, ResistNet, and the Tea Party Patriots all have connections to the Minutemen, a 
paramilitary nativist group which sends armed guards to protect against illegal immigration 
(Hughey and Parks 2014: 31). While the Tea Party movement claimed to primarily be promoting 
a return to traditional small-government of the founders, its rallies quickly revealed racialized 
ideology. For example, many protesters carried signs of portraying Obama as an African 
witchdoctor, or that read "Save White America" (Hughey and Parks 2014). In taking on such 
rhetoric, the Tea Party showed fear that “White America” was losing its social and economic 
prowess. Such claims resonated with reports that America would become a majority minority 
nation by 2044, meaning over half the population would belong to a non-white ethnic group 
(Hughey and Parks 2015; NPR 2015). The rhetoric of the Tea Party showed a protest not only of 
the growth of government, but the changing identity of the nation, represented by President 
Obama. 
 In contrast to the Birther movement, the Tea Party more officially entered 
institutionalized politics. The Tea Party began to support candidates in the run-up to mid-term 
elections in 2010, in hopes of derailing any legislation that Obama tried to pass. The Tea Party 
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endorsed 139 congressional candidates in 2010; 50% of their endorsed candidates were elected 
to the Senate and 31% were elected to the House. It is estimated that the Tea Party increased 
Republican voter turnout for the House elections by 2.7- 5.5 million votes (Madestam et al. 
2013). The effectiveness of the Tea Party to mobilize previously non-voting, mostly poor, White 
American people allowed its rhetoric to be absorbed into the GOP. An echo of the Tea Party's 
rallying cry "Take It Back, Take Your Country Back" can be found Trump's popular campaign 
slogan "Make America Great Again" (Hughey and Parks 2014: 31; Trump campaign website 
2016).  
The (Potential) Rise of Donald Trump: Violent Rallies, Walls, and Muslim Bans  
 Unlike the previous two leaders, it is unknown whether or not Donald Trump will have 
electoral success. However, the potential for Trump to become president of the United States is a 
very real possibility. As of this publication date, Donald Trump has just become the only 
Republican left in the primary race.  
 Donald Trump diverges greatly from the stories of Modi and Orban in that he has had 
little experience within his party before running for president. Through Trump flirted with the 
idea of running for president in 2000 as third-party candidate in Reform Party, he quickly 
withdrew his bid (Diamond 2016). Prior to running for office, Trump was known primarily as 
being an archetypal, flashy businessman. The multi-millionaire son of New York real estate 
developer Fredrick Trump, Donald Trump made a career of putting his namesake on various real 
estate development projects including golf courses, hotels, sport complexes, and, most famously, 
the golden Trump Towers in New York City. Trump further gained name recognition and 
association with wealth and business by appearing on various entertainment programs, including 
creating his own show The Apprentice from 2004-2015, and writing his own book The Art of the 
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Deal. Trump has effectively used his personal wealth to self-fund his campaign and frame 
himself as a political outsider. Further, he has used his celebrity status and name association to 
justify claims that he will be able to "run America like a business" (Scherer 2015). Such claims 
likely appeal to former Tea Partiers who are frustrated by the growth of government, and want to 
see a businessman in the White House.  
 While Trump's association with business and wealth has helped him to portray himself as 
the pinnacle of the American success story, his willingness to be “politically incorrect” has 
attracted a large portion of his voter bloc. Like the Tea Party, Trumps biggest voting block is 
among poor, uneducated, White males. According to a study by the Washington Post, Trump’s 
support remains strongest among those who earn less than $50,000 a year, those who identify 
themselves as conservatives, white non-evangelicals, and those who do not have a college degree 
(Ross 2015). In a time when many White Americans feel threatened by the rise of post-material 
movements like feminism and Black Lives Matter, and changing demographics from 
immigration (Scherer 2015), Trump personifies desires of many White Americans who want to 
be able to "say what they want," even if that is at the expense of a marginalized group. As one 
supporter stated: “He doesn’t care who he pisses off…He says what everyone wants to say but 
are afraid to say.” (Trump supporter qtd. Scherer 2015: 108). Trump’s adoption of common 
language has helped make him relatable to lower-class, uneducated Whites, despite his upper-
class background.   
 Since running for president, Trump has adopted many xenophobic policies and shown 
authoritarian characteristics. One of Trump’s most controversial plans has been to build a wall 
along the entire US-Mexico border. In his presidential announcement speech, Trump stated: 
 “I would build a great wall, and nobody builds walls better than me, and I’ll 
build them inexpensively. I will build a great, great wall on our southern border. 
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And I will have Mexico pay for that wall. Mark my words” (Trump qtd. Drew 
2016). 
 
When former Mexican Vicente Fox bluntly stated on Fusion, “I’m not going to pay for that 
f#@%ing wall,” Trump replied in the following Republican debate, “The wall just got 10 feet 
taller, believe me” (Trump qtd. Drew 2016). Trump claims that he will make Mexico pay for the 
wall by holding remittances to Mexico, and increasing fees for all visas for Mexicans, but this is 
unlikely to make Mexico pay for the estimated over $15 billion it would take to construct such a 
wall (Trump campaign website; Drew 2016). In addition, his platform claims he will create a 
nationwide e-verify program, increase penalties for visa overstays, triple the number of 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement officers, and, end birth-right citizenship for children of 
undocumented immigrants (Trump campaign website 2016). In justifying such harsh positions, 
Trump has widely used claims that Mexican immigrants are criminals and job-stealers. Such 
characterizations scapegoat immigrants as both the cause social problems and economic woes of 
working class Whites, who have not seen the benefits of recent US economic growth since the 
recession.  
 Trump has also played on fears of Muslims in the United States following terrorist 
attacks in Europe. In December of 2015, Trump called for a nation-wide “shut-down” of 
Muslims entering the United States. Trump wrote:  
"Until we are able to determine and understand this problem and the dangerous 
threat it poses, our country cannot be the victims of horrendous attacks by people 
that believe only in Jihad, and have no sense of reason or respect for human 
life."(Johnson 2015)  
 
Not only that, but he has called on increasing US intervention in Syria by “bomb[ing] the sh-t out 
of the Islamic State” and “tak[ing] out their families,” which would be a blatant violation of 
international law (Trump qtd. Scherer 2015).  
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 Perhaps more worrisome has been Trump’s unwillingness to denounce violent and 
radical elements at his rallies. For example, in an interview with CNN Trump refused to disavow 
the endorsement of David Duke, a White nationalist and ex-Ku-Klux Klansman, claiming that he 
“didn’t know him”  (Bradner 2016). Further, Trump has encouraged violence against protesters 
at his rallies, saying that he would pay for the court fees for those who punch protesters, though 
he later took back his promise (Bump 2016). Failing to condemn the violent and radical elements 
at his rallies legitimizes xenophobic rhetoric and violence against political opponents.  
 However, adopting such positions and making such controversial remarks has gotten 
Trump a swarm of media coverage. According to data from media firm mediaQuant, Trump has 
over twice the free media coverage of his leading Democratic opponent Hillary Clinton, and over 
five times the coverage of his former Republican opponent Ted Cruz (Confessore and Yourish 
2016; Figure 2) This free coverage has increased name and brand recognition, and helped to 
mobilize groups that would not normally vote to vote for him in primary elections.  
 In summary, Trump’s success thus far has relied on in his ability to 1.) Mobilize the voter 
base of previous xenophobic movements like Birther movement and Tea Party 2.) Brand himself 
as being the pinnacle of the American success story, and equate his wealth with expertise and 
know-how 3.) Get ill-proportionate media coverage by making controversial, often racist and 
xenophobic remarks or claims 4.) Portray himself as a political "outsider" with simple, tangible 
solutions for the anxieties facing poor Whites who fear changing demographics and power 
structures within the United States. 
Analysis: 
 While each country's unique history has shaped how xenophobia has manifested itself 
within the right-wing party, several common contexts for the rise of xenophobic right wing 
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parties are found in this research. The first is that economic downturns or perceived economic 
injustice open up political opportunities for xenophobic right wing leaders to come to power. In 
India, a decade of rising food prices led to the increased salience of Modi's promise to make 
India a high-tech modern country, and bring electricity to every Indian city. This promise of 
economic prosperity was the driving force of Modi’s campaign, making it overshadow 
xenophobic tendencies within the BJP. In Hungary, the 2008 financial crisis increased discontent 
with an already perceived-to-be corrupt Socialist party, and led to increased salience of Orban's 
message to return Hungary to its former glory, using rhetoric appealing to its Christian roots. 
Similarly, in the United States, economic inequality paired with existing racism and nativism 
after the election of Obama led to increased salience of Trump's message that groups such as 
Mexican immigrants and "cheating" China are to blame for poor economic opportunities for 
uneducated Whites. 
 In addition to economic woes, in Hungary and the United States, the perception of an 
imminent cultural crisis opened political opportunity for xenophobic right wing parties. Both 
Orban and Trump's rhetoric has largely been a reaction to a perceived cultural shift within their 
societies. In Hungary, fear of losing Christian Magyar culture dating back to the Treaty of 
Trianon paired with recent influxes of refugees representing a different religious and cultural 
background have made xenophobic appeals politically expedient. Similarly, in the United States, 
the election of President Obama, a Black man, to the highest office in the United States, paired 
with changing demographics from immigration, has led to a fear among Whites (especially poor 
Whites) that they are losing their privileged place in society. This had led to increased salience of 
appeals that promise to "take the country back" to its former glory, namely by removing or 
oppressing groups that they believed to have caused the changes in the first place. Both Orban 
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and Trump promise to return their nations to the greatness of the past, in which power structures 
and demographic trends better favored the majority group. It is possible that this perceived 
cultural shift is understood as more imminent in Hungary and the United States than India 
because xenophobia in both these two countries has been mostly geared toward immigrants, 
whereas xenophobia against the Muslim population has existed in India since Independence, but 
further empirical research on this topic is needed before concretely making this claim. 
 In addition, in both Hungary and the United States, xenophobic rhetoric was adopted by 
leaders of right wing parties because of the influence of harder right wing social movements or 
parties within each country. In Hungary, the increased popularity of the extremely xenophobic 
party Jobbik led Orban to adopt its their rhetoric and positions in order to co-opt its base. In the 
United States, Trump has largely taken on the xenophobic rhetoric from the Tea Party, likely 
because of its past electoral success in 2010.  
 In contrast, in India, Modi has risen to power largely despite xenophobic the tendencies 
within his party, as this type of rhetoric has become less popular in recent years as India has 
opened up to the global economy under his neoliberal vision. However, this does not mean that 
farther right groups have not had an influence on the BJP. Under Modi, more radical members of 
the BJP, influenced by farther right groups such as the RSS and Shiv Sena, have become 
emboldened, leading to an increased demands for controversial Hindutva polices, like banning 
the slaughter of cattle.  
 In all three cases, disillusionment with a liberal party helped to give rise to the right-wing 
alternative. In India, the failed economic policies of the largely dynastic Congress Party helped 
to increase the salience of Modi's contrasting neoliberal underdog message, and allowed the BJP 
to frame the Congress Party as uncaring "princelings." Hungary is perhaps the most obvious 
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example of disillusionment leading to the rise of the right wing. Ferenc Gyurcsány's leak stained 
the image of his party and disillusioned people with idea of secular liberalism in general. This 
led voters to seek a moral, strong, and religiously rooted leader like Orban as an alternative. In 
the United States, where the election is still unfolding, this is more difficult to observe. However, 
at least among Trump supporters, Obama's failure to deliver growth which benefitted the 
uneducated lower classes has allowed Trump promises that he is a businessman who knows how 
"get things done" to become more resonant.  
 Finally, the leadership of all three parties was able to effectively embody a national 
desire, or connect themselves to an idealized founding principle of their nation-state through 
their personal backgrounds. In India, Modi's identity and clean-cut image made him embody 
hopes that India could go from "rags to riches" through neoliberal economic development. In 
Hungary, Orban's connection to the national martyr Imre Nagy helped him to embody Hungarian 
ideals of the strength, conviction, and perseverance, which people felt were needed after the 
country fell victim to corruption and economic woes. Finally, Trump, through his celebrity 
status, promoted himself as having reached the pinnacle of American dream.” In addition, 
Trump’s outlandish antics and outbursts have given him disproportionate media attention, and 
gotten positive feedback from his constituents. To his constituents, Trump likely represents the 
absolute freedom that many Americans desire and feel they are losing because of rising post-
material movements like Black Lives Matters and the feminist movement which demand 
“political-correctness.”  
Future Research Suggestions: 
 In order more directly understand the reasons why people vote for right wing parties, 
more empirical studies involving polling on voter motivations is needed in all three contexts in 
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order to make comparisons. In addition, comparing other examples of xenophobia across the 
globe such as in Japan or South Africa for example could add to richness of this type of 
comparative thinking. Finally, comparing rhetoric in the speeches of right wing leaders across 
the globe could be useful in understanding the types of appeals being used by right wing leaders. 
This study largely relied on quotes from Western media outlets because of language barriers, but 
future studies with translators could add to discourse on this topic. Such studies could more 
directly prove or contest the claims made in this paper.  
Conclusion:  
 Regardless of how xenophobic right-wing leaders have come to power, their rise is 
worrisome in a time when the world and its people are becoming increasingly interconnected. 
Groups that build walls—both literal and metaphorical—between groups threaten the ideals of 
global cooperation, and help to perpetuate conflict within countries. Understanding the contexts 
that allow these types of leaders and their parties to come to power may help us to identify when 
populations will become vulnerable to divisive rhetoric, but this is only one step in 
understanding the root causes of xenophobia. 
 In theory, in democratic societies, people have the agency to choose leaders that they 
believe reflect their best interests. While India and Hungary have both already elected right-wing 
leaders and have seen the results—arrests on sedition charges, violence on the floor of 
parliament, censorship of the media, a religiously restrictive constitution—citizens of the United 
States still have a choice to make. They can choose to build walls or build bridges. They can 
choose to be governed by fear, or to embrace a changing and complicated world. To quote Ernest 
Becker: 
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“It is [fear] that makes people so willing to follow brash, strong-looking 
demagogues with tight jaws and loud voices: those who focus their measured 
words and sharpened eyes in the intensity of hate, and so seem capable of 
cleansing the world of the vague, the weak, the uncertain, the evil. Ah to give 
oneself over to their direction—what calm, what relief.” (Becker 1971) 
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APPENDIX: 
 
Figure 1: Number of Migrants Entering Europe Illegally (Balkan Route highlighted purple) 
 
 
(BBC 2016) 
 
 
Figure 2: Free vs. Paid for Media Coverage by Candidate in Millions of Dollar by March 2016 
 
(Confessore and Yourish 2016)  
 42 
Work Cited 
 
Anderson, B. R. (1991). Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of 
nationalism. London: Verso.  
 
Andor, J. (1998). New Striker in Old Team Parliamentary Elections in Hungary, May 1998. 
Labour Focus on Eastern Europe, 60. Retrieved May 4, 2016.  
 
Appadurai, A. (2006). Fear of Small Numbers: An Essay on the Geography of Anger. Durham, 
New Jersey: Duke University Press. 
 
BBC News. (2005, May 11). BBC NEWS | South Asia | Gujarat riot death toll revealed. 
Retrieved May 04, 2016, from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4536199.stm  
 
BBC News. (2006, September 18). We lied to win, says Hungary PM. Retrieved May 04, 2016, 
from http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/5354972.stm  
 
BBC News. (2015, September 4). Hungary PM Viktor Orban: Antagonising Europe since 2010. 
Retrieved May 04, 2016, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-16390574  
 
BBC News. (2016, March 4). Migrant crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven charts - 
BBC News. Retrieved May 04, 2016, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911  
 
Becker, E. (1971). The Birth and Death of Meaning: An interdisciplinary perspective on the 
problem of man. New York: The Free Press.  
 
BJP website. (2016, April 10). Bharatiya Janata Party - The Party With a Difference. Retrieved 
May 04, 2016, from http://www.bjp.org/  
 
Bose, S. (1998). Nationalism, democracy, and development: State and politics in India. Delhi: 
Oxford University Press.  
 
Bradner, E. (2016, February 19). Donald Trump stumbles on David Duke, KKK. Retrieved May 
04, 2016, from http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/28/politics/donald-trump-white-supremacists/  
 
Bump, P. (2016, March 15). Donald Trump reverses course on paying legal fees for man who 
attacked protester. But could he do it? Retrieved May 04, 2016, from 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/03/10/trump-once-said-he-would-pay-
legal-fees-for-people-who-beat-up-protesters-now-that-its-happened-can-he/  
 
 
Calamur, K. (2016, February 12). The Sedition Charge Against a Student Leader in India. 
Retrieved May 04, 2016, from http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/02/india-
jnu-sedition/462567/  
 
 43 
Cahn, C. (2016). Roma in Hungary - Challenging Descrimination Promoting Equality. Retrieved 
May 4, 2016, from http://www.eerc.org/popup-article-view.php?article_id=1225  
 
CIA World Factbook. (2016). Hungary Profile. Retrieved May 03, 2016, from 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/  
 
CIA World Factbook. (2016). India Profile. Retrieved May 03, 2016, from 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/  
 
Confessore, N., & Yourish, K. (2016, March 16). Measuring Donald Trump’s Mammoth 
Advantage in Free Media. Retrieved May 04, 2016, from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/16/upshot/measuring-donald-trumps-mammoth-advantage-in-
free-media.html?_r=0  
 
Cspeli, G., & Örkeny, A. (1996). The Changing Facets of Hungarian Nationalism. Social 
Research, 63(1), 247-286.  
 
DeSilvio, J. (2001). Rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party in India. The Orator, 17-28.  
 
Dalrymple, W. (2014, May 16). Is India's New Prime Minister a Neo-Fascist or a Reformer? 
Retrieved May 04, 2016, from https://newrepublic.com/article/117793/narendra-modi-indias-
new-prime-minister-neo-fascist-or-reformer  
 
Diamond, J. (2016, February 29). Who is Donald Trump? Retrieved May 04, 2016, from 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/10/politics/who-is-donald-trump/  
 
Drew, K. (2015, October 09). What Trump's immigration wall could cost the US. Retrieved May 
04, 2016, from http://www.cnbc.com/2015/10/09/this-is-what-trumps-border-wall-could-cost-
us.html  
 
Dunai, M. (2014, February 19). How Hungary's government shaped public media to its mould. 
Retrieved May 04, 2016, from http://www.reuters.com/article/us-hungary-media-insight-
idUSBREA1I08C20140219  
 
Economist. (2012, January 07). The Long March of Fidesz. Retrieved May 04, 2016, from 
http://www.economist.com/node/21542422  
 
Economist. (2015). The Gujarat Model. Retrieved May 04, 2016, from 
http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21638147-how-modi-nomics-was-
forged-one-indias-most-business-friendly-states  
 
Encyclopædia Britannica. (2016). Viktor Orban. Retrieved May 04, 2016, from 
http://www.britannica.com/biography/Viktor-Orban  
 
Fields, B. (1990). Slavery, Race and Ideology in the United States of America. New Left Review, 
I(181).  
 44 
Fundamental Law. (2011). Hungary Fundamental Law. Retrieved May 4, 2016, from 
http://www.kormany.hu/download/e/02/00000/The New Fundamental Law of Hungary.pdf  
 
Freeman, C. (2009, March 21). Hungary's Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsany Resigns. Retrieved 
May 04, 2016, from 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/hungary/5028910/Hungarys-prime-
minister-Ferenc-Gyurcsany-resigns.html  
 
Gowen, A. (2016, February 19). Comment on religious tolerance by Indian leader sparks 
national debate. Retrieved May 04, 2016, from 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/comment-on-religious-tolerance-by-indian-
leader-sparks-national-debate/2015/02/18/dfdcc543-f4b9-45b3-a2a5-392b007452f5_story.html  
 
Hjerm, M., & Nagayoshi, K. (2011). The composition of the minority population as a threat: Can 
real economic and cultural threats explain xenophobia? International Sociology, 26(6), 815-843. 
doi:10.1177/0268580910394004  
 
Hjerm, M. (1998). National Identities, National Pride and Xenophobia: A Comparison of Four 
Western Countries. Acta Sociologica, 41(4), 335-347. doi:10.1080/00016999850080005  
 
Hogan, J., & Haltinner, K. (2015). Floods, Invaders, and Parasites: Immigration Threat 
Narratives and Right-Wing Populism in the USA, UK and Australia. Journal of Intercultural 
Studies, 36(5), 520-543. doi:10.1080/07256868.2015.1072907  
 
 
Hughey, M. W., & Parks, G. S. (2014). The Wrongs of the Right: Language, race, and the 
Republican Party in the age of Obama. New York, NY: New York University Press. 
 
Huntington, S. P. (2004). Who Are We?: The challenges to America's national identity. New 
York: Simon & Schuster.  
 
Human Rights Watch. (2011, April 19). Hungary: New Constitution Enshrines Discrimination. 
Retrieved May 04, 2016, from https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/04/19/hungary-new-constitution-
enshrines-discrimination  
 
Feher, M. (2015, October 15). Hungary Completes Croatia Border Fence to Keep Migrants Out. 
Retrieved May 04, 2016, from http://www.wsj.com/articles/hungary-completes-croatia-border-
fence-to-keep-migrants-out-1444927774  
 
ILO, IOM, OHCHR. (2001). International Migration, Racism, Discrimination and Xenophobia. 
WORLD CONFERENCE AGAINST RACISM, RACIAL DISCRIMINATION, XENOPHOBIA 
AND RELATED INTOLERANCE (WCAR). Retrieved May 3, 2016, from 
http://www.unesco.org/most/migration/imrdx.pdf  
 
Ignazi, P. (2003). The Intellectual Basis of Right‐Wing Anti‐Partyism. European Journal of 
Political Research. Retrieved May 3, 2016.  
 45 
 
Khawly, C. (2004, February 25). Impact of September 11 on Traditional Openness to Immigrants 
and Non-Immigrants: An Arab-American Community Perspective. Retrieved May 04, 2016, 
from http://www.adc.org/2004/02/center-u-impact-of-september-11-on-traditional-openness-to-
immigrants-and-non-immigrants-an-arab-american-community-perspective-u-center/  
 
Klotz, A. (2016). Borders and the Roots of Xenophobia in South Africa. South African Historical 
Journal, 1-15. doi:10.1080/02582473.2016.1153708  
 
Knobel, D. (1995). America for the Americans: The Nativist Movement in the United States. 
Social Forces, 76(1), 344-346. Retrieved May 4, 2016.  
 
Jaffrelot, C. (2013). Gujarat Elections: The Sub-Text of Modi's 'Hattrick'—High Tech Populism 
and the 'Neo-middle Class' Studies in Indian Politics, 1(1), 79-95. 
doi:10.1177/2321023013482789  
 
Johnson, M. (2015, December 7). Donald Trump just called for banning Muslims from entering 
the country. Retrieved May 04, 2016, from http://www.motherjones.com/mojo/2015/12/donald-
trump-just-called-complete-shutdown-muslim-immigration  
 
Juhász, J. (2003, November 01). Hungary: Transit Country Between East and West. Retrieved 
May 04, 2016, from http://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/hungary-transit-country-between-
east-and-west  
 
Mackey, R. (2015, September 03). Hungarian Leader Rebuked for Saying Muslim Migrants 
Must Be Blocked ‘to Keep Europe Christian’. Retrieved May 04, 2016, from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/world/europe/hungarian-leader-rebuked-for-saying-
muslim-migrants-must-be-blocked-to-keep-europe-christian.html?_r=0  
 
Madestam, A., Shoag, D., & Yanagizawa-Drott, D. (2013). Do Political Protests Matter? 
Evidence from the Tea Party Movement. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128(4), 1633-
1685.  
 
Metcalf, B. D., & Metcalf, T. R. (2012). A concise history of modern India. New York: 
Cambridge Univ. Press.  
 
Merkl, P. H., & Weinberg, L. (2003). Right-wing extremism in the twenty-first century. London: 
Frank Cass.  
 
Mogul, P. (2015, October 08). India: Muslim politician who hosted controversial 'beef party' 
attacked by Hindu BJP legislators. Retrieved May 04, 2016, from 
http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/india-legislator-violently-attacked-by-bjp-members-house-hosting-
beef-party-1523071  
 
 46 
Nagy, A., Boros, T., & Vasali, Z. (2013). Right-Wing Extremism in Europe: Country Analyses, 
Counter-Strategies and Labor-Market Oriented Exit Strategies. Fredrich-Ebert Foundation, 229-
255. Retrieved May 4, 2016.  
 
Nolan, D., & Connolly, K. (2015, September 01). Hungary closes main Budapest station to 
refugees. Retrieved May 04, 2016, from 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/01/migrant-crisis-hungary-closes-main-budapest-
station  
 
Nussbaum, M. C. (2007). The Clash Within: Democracy, religious violence, and India's future. 
Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.  
 
NPR. (2015, March 4). For U.S. Children, Minorities Will Be The Majority By 2020, Census 
Says. Retrieved May 04, 2016, from http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2015/03/04/390672196/for-u-s-children-minorities-will-be-the-majority-by-2020-census-
says  
 
Nyíri, P. (2003). Xenophobia in Hungary: A Regional Comparison. Center for Policy Studies. 
Retrieved May 4, 2016.  
 
Onyanga-Omara, J. (2015, January 7). Timeline: Terror attacks in Europe over the years. 
Retrieved May 4, 2016, from http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/01/07/terror-
attacks-europe/21384069/  
 
Omer, A., & Springs, J. A. (2013). Religious Nationalism. Santa Barbara, California: ABC-
CLIO. 
 
Pew Research. (2015, November 19). 5 facts about illegal immigration in the U.S. Retrieved 
May 05, 2016, from http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/11/19/5-facts-about-illegal-
immigration-in-the-u-s/  
 
Ramet, S. P. (1984). Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and East European Politics. Durham, 
NC: Duke University Press.  
 
Ross, J. (2016, December 15). Who really supports Donald Trump, Ted Cruz, Ben Carson, 
Marco Rubio and Jeb Bush - in 5 charts. Retrieved May 04, 2016, from 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/12/15/who-really-supports-donald-
trump-ted-cruz-ben-carson-marco-rubio-and-jeb-bush-in-5-charts/  
 
Seshia, S. (1998). Divide and Rule in Indian Party Politics: The Rise of the Bharatiya Janata 
Party. Asian Survey, 38(11), 1036-1050. doi:10.2307/2645684  
 
Scherer, M. (2015, December 21). Donald Trump: He Blew Open the Republican Presidential - 
and the Republican Party. Time Magazine, 3, 106-114.  
 
Singh, K. (2009). Islamophobia in India: A Case Stufy of Gujarat 2002. University of Tromso.  
 47 
 
Taras, R. (2009). Transnational Xenophobia in Europe? Literary Representations of 
Contemporary Fears. The European Legacy, 14(4), 391-407. doi:10.1080/10848770902999492  
 
Trump campaign website. (2016). Make America Great Again. Retrieved May 04, 2016, from 
https://www.donaldjtrump.com/  
 
UNESCO. (2016). Xenophobia | United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization. Retrieved May 03, 2016, from http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-
sciences/themes/international-migration/glossary/xenophobia/  
 
Wimmer, A. (1997). Explaining xenophobia and racism: A critical review of current research 
approaches. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 20(1), 17-41. doi:10.1080/01419870.1997.9993946  
 
Yamaguchi, T. (2013). Xenophobia in Action: Ultranationalism, Hate Speech, and the Internet in 
Japan. Radical History Review, 2013(117), 98-118. doi:10.1215/01636545-2210617 
 
Yakushko, O. (2009). Xenophobia: Understanding the Roots and Consequences of Negative 
Attitudes Toward Immigrants. The Counseling Psychologist, 37(1), 36-66. 
doi:10.1177/0011000008316034  
 
 
 
